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Abstract 
Companies have increasingly turned to application service 
providers (ASPs) or Software as a Service (SaaS) vendors to 
offer specialized web-based services that will cut costs and 
provide specific and focused applications to users.  The 
complexity of designing, installing, configuring, deploying, and 
supporting the system with internal resources can be eliminated 
with this type of methodology, providing great benefit to 
organizations.  However, these models can present an 
authentication problem for corporations with a large number of 
external service providers.  This paper describes the 
implementation of Security Assertion Markup Language 
(SAML) and its capabilities to provide secure single sign-on 
(SSO) solutions for externally hosted applications. 
Keywords: Security, SAML, Single Sign-On, Web, 
Authentication 
1. Introduction 
Organizations for the most part have recently started 
using a central authentication source for internal 
applications and web-based portals.  This single source 
of authentication, when configured properly, provides 
strong security in the sense that users no longer keep 
passwords for different systems on sticky notes on 
monitors or under their keyboards.  In addition, 
management and auditing of users becomes simplified 
with this central store. 
As more web services are being hosted by external 
service providers, the sticky note problem has reoccurred 
for these outside applications.  Users are now forced to 
remember passwords for HR benefits, travel agencies, 
expense processing, etc. - or programmers must develop 
custom SSO code for each site.  Management of users 
becomes a complex problem for the help desk and 
custom built code for each external service provider can 
become difficult to administer and maintain. 
In addition, there are problems for the external service 
provider as well.  Every user in an organization will need 
to be set up for the service provider’s application, 
causing a duplicate set of data.  Instead, if the 
organization can control this user data, it would save the 
service provider time by not needing to set up and 
terminate user access on a daily basis.  Furthermore, one 
central source would allow the data to be more accurate 
and up-to-date. 
Given this set of problems for organizations and their 
service providers, it is apparent that a solution is needed 
that provides a standard for authentication information to 
be exchanged over the Internet.  Security Assertion 
Markup Language (SAML) provides a secure, XML-
based solution for exchanging user security information 
between an identity provider (our organization) and a 
service provider (ASPs or SaaSs).  The SAML standard 
defines rules and syntax for the data exchange, yet is 
flexible and can allow for custom data to be transmitted 
to the external service provider. 
2. Background 
The consortium for defining SAML standards and 
security is OASIS (Organization for the Advancement of 
Structured Information Standards).  They are a non-profit 
international organization that promotes the development 
and adoption of open standards for security and web 
services.  OASIS was founded in 1993 under SGML 
(Standard Generalized Markup Language) Open until its 
name change in 1998.  Headquarters for OASIS are 
located in North America, but there is active member 
participation internationally in 100 countries on five 
continents [1]. 
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SAML 1.0 became an OASIS standard toward the end of 
2002, with its early formations beginning in 2001.  The 
goal behind SAML 1.0 was to form a XML framework 
to allow for the authentication and authorization from a 
single sign-on perspective.  At the time of this milestone, 
other companies and consortiums started extending 
SAML 1.0.  While these extensions were being formed, 
the SAML 1.1 specification was ratified as an OASIS 
standard in the fall of 2003. 
The next major revision of SAML is 2.0, and it became 
an official OASIS Standard in 2005.  SAML 2.0 involves 
major changes to the SAML specifications.  This is the 
first revision of the standard that is not backwards 
compatible, and it provides significant additional 
functionality [2].  SAML 2.0 now supports W3C XML 
encryption to satisfy privacy requirements [3].  Another 
advantage that SAML 2.0 includes is the support for 
service provider initiated web single sign-on exchanges.  
This allows for the service provider to query the identity 
provider for authentication.  Additionally, SAML 2.0 
adds “Single Logout” functionality.  The remainder of 
this text will be discussing implementation of a SAML 
2.0 environment. 
There are three roles involved in a SAML transaction – 
an asserting party, a relying party, and a subject.  The 
asserting party (identity provider) is the system in 
authority that provides the user information.  The relying 
party (service provider) is the system that trusts the 
asserting party’s information, and uses the data to 
provide an application to the user.  The user and their 
identity that is involved in the transaction are known as 
the subject. 
The components that make up the SAML standard are 
assertions, protocols, bindings and profiles.  Each layer 
of the standard can be customized, allowing specific 
business cases to be addressed per company.  Since each 
company’s scenarios could be unique, the 
implementation of these business cases should be able to 
be personalized per service and per identity providers. 
The transaction from the asserting party to the relying 
party is called a SAML assertion.  The relying party 
assumes that all data contained in the assertion from the 
asserting party is valid.  The structure of the SAML 
assertion is defined by the XML schema and contains 
header information, the subject and statements about the 
subject in the form of attributes and conditions.  The 
assertion can also contain authorization statements 
defining what the user is permitted to do inside the web 
application. 
The SAML standard defines request and response 
protocols used to communicate the assertions between 
the service provider (relying party) and the identity 
provider (asserting party).  Some example protocols are 
[4]: 
• Authentication Request Protocol – defines how 
the service provider can request an assertion 
that contains authentication or attribute 
statements 
• Single Logout Protocol – defines the 
mechanism to allow for logout of all service 
providers 
• Artifact Resolution Protocol – defines how the 
initial artifact value and then the 
request/response values are passed between the 
identity provider and the service provider.   
• Name Identifier Management Protocol – defines 
how to add, change or delete the value of the 
name identifier for the service provider 
SAML bindings map the SAML protocols onto standard 
lower level network communication protocols used to 
transport the SAML assertions between the identity 
provider and service provider.  Some example bindings 
used are [4]: 
• HTTP Redirect Binding – uses HTTP redirect 
messages 
• HTTP POST Binding – defines how assertions 
can be transported using base64-encoded 
content 
• HTTP Artifact Binding – defines how an 
artifact is transported to the receiver using 
HTTP 
• SOAP HTTP Binding – uses SOAP 1.1 
messages and SOAP over HTTP 
The highest SAML component level is profiles, or the 
business use cases between the service provider and the 
identity provider that dictate how the assertion, protocol 
and bindings will work together to provide SSO.  Some 
example profiles are [4]: 
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• Web Browser SSO Profile – uses the 
Authentication Request Protocol, and any of the 
following bindings:  HTTP Redirect, HTTP 
POST and HTTP Artifact 
• Single Logout Profile – uses the Single Logout 
Protocol, which can log the user out of all 
service providers using a single logout function 
• Artifact Resolution Profile – uses the Artifact 
Resolution Protocol over a SOAP HTTP 
binding 
• Name Identifier Management Profile – uses the 
name Identifier management Protocol and can 
be used with HTTP Redirect, HTTP POST, 
HTTP Artifact or SOAP 
Two profiles will be briefly discussed in more detail, the 
artifact resolution profile and web browser SSO profile.  
The artifact resolution profile can be used if the business 
case requires highly sensitive data to pass between the 
identity provider and service provider, or if the two 
partners want to utilize an existing secure connection 
between the two companies. 
This profile allows for a small value, called an artifact to 
be passed between the browser and the service provider 
by one of the HTTP bindings.  After the service provider 
receives the artifact, it transmits the artifact and the 
request/response messages out of band from the browser 
back to the identity provider.  Most likely the messages 
are transmitted over a SSL VPN connection between the 
two companies.  This provides security for the message, 
plus eliminates the need for the assertions to be signed or 
encrypted which could potentially reduce overhead.  
When the identify provider receives the artifact, it looks 
up the value in its database and processes the request.  
After all out of band messages are transmitted between 
the identity provider and service provider, the service 
provider presents the information directly to the browser. 
The web browser SSO profile may be initiated by the 
identify provider or the service provider.  If initiated by 
the identity provider, the assertion is either signed, 
encrypted, or both.  In the web browser SSO profile, all 
of the assertion information is sent at once to the service 
provider using any of the HTTP bindings and protocols.  
The service provider decrypts if necessary and checks for 
message integrity against the signature.  Next, it parses 
the SAML XML statements and gathers any attributes 
that were passed, and then performs SSO using the 
Assertion Consumer Service.  The diagram in Figure 1 
shows the identity provider initiated SAML assertion. 
 
Figure 1:  Identity Provider Initiated SAML Assertion Flowchart 
If the user accesses the external webpage without passing 
through the internal federated identity manager first, the 
service provider will need to issue the SAML request 
back to the identity provider on behalf of the user.  This 
process of SSO is called service provider initiated.  In 
this case, the user arrives at a webpage specific for the 
company, but without a SAML assertion.  The service 
provider redirects the user back to the identity provider’s 
federation webpage with a SAML request, and optionally 
with a RelayState query string variable that can be used 
to determine what SAML entity to utilize when sending 
the assertion back to the service provider. 
After receiving the request from the service provider, the 
identity provider processes the SAML request as if it 
came internally.  This use case is important since it 
allows users to be able to bookmark external sites 
directly, but still provides SAML SSO capabilities with 
browser redirects.  Figure 2 demonstrates this service 
provider initiated use case. 
The most popular business use case for SAML federation 
is the web browser SSO profile, used in conjunction with 
the HTTP POST binding and authentication request 
protocol.  The implementation and framework section 
will discuss this specific use case and the security needed 
to protect data integrity. 
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Figure 2:  Service Provider Initiated SAML Assertion Flowchart 
3. Implementation/Framework 
There are numerous identity and federation manager 
products on the market that support federation via SAML 
versions 1.1 and 2.0, as well as several open source 
products.  OpenSAML, an open source toolkit, is 
available to support developers working with SAML.  
Shibboleth is an example of an open source project that 
uses the OpenSAML toolkit.  Sun Microsystems has a 
product called OpenSSO that is an open source version 
of their commercial product, OpenSSO Enterprise.  
Computer Associates provides an access manager called 
SiteMinder and RSA has a product called Federated 
Identity Manager to name a few.  Regardless of which 
product is selected, as long as it conforms to the 
standards of SAML, all products can be used 
interchangeably with no compatibility issues. 
The process of setting up federation involves configuring 
a local entity, a partner entity, and an association 
between the two that forms the federation.  The local 
entity must be manually configured inside the federation 
software; however, for SAML 2.0 the process of setting 
up the partner entity has been made easier with the 
introduction of metadata.  Since the SAML standard is 
flexible and can allow a number of custom 
configurations, certain agreements and configuration 
information must be initially set up between two 
partners.  Exchanging metadata containing this specific 
information determines the specifications that will be 
used in a particular business case. 
Once the metadata file has been received from the 
partner entity, this XML file can be uploaded into the 
federation software without any additional configuration 
needed for the partner entity.  This process saves time 
and reduces the possibility for error.  The file contains 
elements and attributes, and includes an EntityDescriptor 
and EntityID that specifies to which entity the 
configuration refers. 
There are many optional elements and attributes for 
metadata files; some that may apply are Binding, 
WantAuthRequestsSigned, WantAssertionsSigned, 
SingleLogoutService, etc.  To review the entire list of 
elements available for the metadata file, see the OASIS 
metadata standard [5]. 
When manually configuring a local entity, first 
determine the parameters to be passed in the assertion 
that will be the unique username for each user.  Normally 
this value is an email address or employee number, since 
they are guaranteed to be exclusive for each individual.  
In some federation products, values from a data source 
can be automatically utilized with the SAML assertion.  
These values can be extracted from different data sources 
such as LDAP, or another source that could be tied into a 
HR system.  While setting up the local entity there are 
other considerations, such as how the parameters will be 
passed (in attributes or nameID), a certificate keystore 
for the association, and type of signing policies required. 
The following sample metadata shown in Figure 3 is an 
example that would be sent from the local entity (identity 
provider in this case) to the partner entity (service 
provider) to load into the federation software.  The 
descriptor shows titled as “IDPSSODescriptor”, which 
demonstrates this is metadata from an identity provider. 
Some elements are mandatory, such as entityID, yet 
others are optional, such as ID and OrganizationName.  
The elements to note are the Single Sign-On Service 
binding, location, protocol support section, and key 
descriptor and key info areas.  In this example, the 
binding must be performed by an HTTP-POST, and the 
supported protocol is SAML 2.0. 
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<md:EntityDescriptor ID="MyCompany"  
     entityID="mycompany:saml2.0"  
     xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#"   
     xmlns:md="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:metadata"  
     xmlns:query="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:metadata:ext:query" 
     xmlns:saml="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:assertion"  
     xmlns:xenc="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#"> 
  <md:IDPSSODescriptor WantAuthnRequestsSigned="false"  
     protocolSupportEnumeration= 
          "urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:protocol"> 
    <md:KeyDescriptor use="encryption"> 
      <ds:KeyInfo  
        xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#"> 
 <ds:X509Data> 
   <ds:X509Certificate> 
     CERTIFICATE 
   </ds:X509Certificate> 
 </ds:X509Data> 
      </ds:KeyInfo> 
      <md:EncryptionMethod  
       Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#aes128-cbc"> 
      </md:EncryptionMethod> 
    </md:KeyDescriptor> 
      <md:KeyDescriptor use="signing"> 
        <ds:KeyInfo xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#"> 
   <ds:X509Data> 
     <ds:X509Certificate> 
       CERTIFICATE 
     </ds:X509Certificate> 
          </ds:X509Data> 
        </ds:KeyInfo> 
      </md:KeyDescriptor> 
      <md:SingleSignOnService  
        Binding="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:bindings:HTTP-POST"  
        Location="http://mycompany.com/sso/SSO"> 
      </md:SingleSignOnService> 
  </md:IDPSSODescriptor> 
  <md:Organization> 
    <md:OrganizationName xml:lang="en-us"> 
      My Company Org 
    </md:OrganizationName> 
    <md:OrganizationDisplayName xml:lang="en-us"> 
      My Company  
    </md:OrganizationDisplayName> 
    <md:OrganizationURL xml:lang="en-s"> 
      http://www.mycompany.com 
    </md:OrganizationURL> 
  </md:Organization> 
</md:EntityDescriptor> 
Figure 3:  Sample Identity Provider Metadata XML 
Figure 4 demonstrates an example metadata XML file 
that would be sent from a service provider to an identity 
provider for loading into the federation software.  Note 
that the descriptor is “SPSSODescriptor”, indicating 
service provider single sign-on descriptor. 
In this case, “WantAuthnRequestsSigned” is equal to 
true, as opposed to the previous example in Figure 3.  
Also, there are two KeyDescriptors, one for signing and 
one for encrypting.  This indicates the service provider 
requires both for the assertion.  There are two methods of 
binding listed for the assertion consumer service:  the 
HTTP Post and the HTTP Artifact.  These two metadata 
samples show how custom each company can be with 
unique SAML requirements. 
<EntityDescriptor  
     entityID="mypartner:saml2.0"  
     xmlns="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:metadata"> 
  <SPSSODescriptor  
     AuthnRequestsSigned="true"  
     WantAssertionsSigned="true"  
     protocolSupportEnumeration= 
        "urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:protocol"> 
    <KeyDescriptor use="signing"> 
      <ds:KeyInfo xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#"> 
        <ds:X509Data> 
          <ds:X509Certificate>CERTIFICATE</ds:X509Certificate> 
        </ds:X509Data> 
      </ds:KeyInfo> 
    </KeyDescriptor> 
    <KeyDescriptor use="encryption"> 
      <ds:KeyInfo xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#"> 
        <ds:X509Data> 
          <ds:X509Certificate>CERTIFICATE</ds:X509Certificate> 
        </ds:X509Data> 
      </ds:KeyInfo> 
      <EncryptionMethod  
        Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#aes128-cbc"> 
        <xenc:KeySize  
          xmlns:xenc="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#">128 
        </xenc:KeySize> 
      </EncryptionMethod> 
    </KeyDescriptor> 
      <NameIDFormat> 
        urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:nameid-format:transient 
      </NameIDFormat> 
      <AssertionConsumerService  
         index="0"  
         isDefault="true"  
         Binding="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:bindings:HTTP-POST"  
         Location="https://mypartner.com/federation/metaAlias/sp"/> 
      <AssertionConsumerService  
         index="1"  
         Binding="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:bindings:HTTP-Artifact"  
         Location="https://mypartner.com/federation/metaAlias/sp"/> 
  </SPSSODescriptor> 
</EntityDescriptor> 
Figure 4:  Sample Service Provider Metadata XML 
After the metadata is exchanged and all entities are set 
up, the assertion can be tested and verified using browser 
tools and decoders.  For this example, the service 
provider implementation of the HTTP POST method will 
be described briefly. 
The identity provider must first determine what URL the 
federation software requires, and what attributes need to 
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be passed with the POST data, such as entityID or 
RelayState.  The browser HTTP-POST action contains 
hidden SAMLResponse and RelayState fields enclosed 
in a HTML form.  After the browser POST is received 
by the service provider, the Assertion Consumer Service 
validates the signature and processes the assertion, 
gathering attributes and other conditions that could 
optionally be required.  The service provider also obtains 
the optional RelayState variable in the HTML form, 
determines the application URL, and redirects the 
browser to it providing single sign-on to the web 
application [4]. 
To validate the sent attributes in the assertion with this 
HTTP POST example, a browser add-on program can be 
used to watch exactly what is sent between the browser 
and the partner.  A few browser add-ons are “HttpFox” 
[6] which can be used with Mozilla Firefox, and 
“HttpWatch” [7] which can be used with Mozilla Firefox 
or Internet Explorer.  After capturing HTTP data, the 
browser POST action can be verified to ensure the proper 
attributes are passed to the partner.  The POST action 
shows the hidden SAMLResponse and RelayState fields 
in the HTML form, and can be used to validate the data 
sent to the service provider. 
The SAMLResponse field is URL encoded, and must be 
decoded before reading the assertion.  Depending on the 
requirements, the assertion must be signed, or signed and 
encrypted.  For testing purposes, first only sign the 
assertion so it can be URL decoded into a non-encrypted 
readable version.  Figure 5 shows an example of a URL 
decoded SAMLResponse and has been shortened for 
readability, designated by capital words. 
<samlp:Response xmlns:saml="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:assertion"  
 xmlns:samlp="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:protocol"  
 Consent="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:consent:unspecified"  
 Destination="https://mypartner.com/metaAlias/sp"  
 ID="ad58514ea9365e51c382218fea"  
 IssueInstant="2009-04-22T12:33:36Z"  
 Version="2.0"> 
  <saml:Issuer>http://login.mycompany.com/mypartner</saml:Issuer> 
  <ds:Signature xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#"> 
    SIGNATURE VALUE, ALGORITHM, ETC. 
  </ds:Signature> 
  <samlp:Status> 
    <samlp:StatusCode  
 Value="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:status:Success"> 
    </samlp:StatusCode> 
  </samlp:Status> 
  <saml:Assertion ID="1234" IssueInstant="2009-04-22T12:33:36Z"  
 Version="2.0"> 
    <saml:Issuer>http://login.mycompany.com/mypartner</saml:Issuer> 
    <ds:Signature xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#"> 
      SIGNATURE VALUE, ALGORITHM, ETC. 
    </ds:Signature> 
    <saml:Subject> 
      <saml:NameID>NAMEID FORMAT, INFO, ETC</saml:NameID> 
      <saml:SubjectConfirmation  
 Method="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:cm:bearer"> 
        <saml:SubjectConfirmationData  
    NotOnOrAfter="2009-04-22T12:43:36Z"  
    Recipient="https://mypartner.com/metaAlias/sp"> 
 </saml:SubjectConfirmationData> 
      </saml:SubjectConfirmation> 
    </saml:Subject> 
    <saml:Conditions  
 NotBefore="2009-04-22T12:28:36Z"  
 NotOnOrAfter="2009-04-22T12:33:36Z"> 
      <saml:AudienceRestriction> 
        <saml:Audience>mypartner.com:saml2.0</saml:Audience> 
      </saml:AudienceRestriction> 
    </saml:Conditions> 
    <saml:AuthnStatement AuthnInstant="2009-04-22T12:33:20Z"  
 SessionIndex="ccda16bc322adf4f74d556bd"> 
      <saml:SubjectLocality Address="192.168.0.189"  
 DNSName="myserver.mycompany.com"> 
      </saml:SubjectLocality> 
    </saml:AuthnStatement> 
    <saml:AttributeStatement xmlns:xs=SCHEMA INFO> 
      <saml:Attribute FriendlyName="clientId" Name="clientId"  
    NameFormat="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0: 
  attrname-format:basic"> 
        <saml:AttributeValue>1234</saml:AttributeValue> 
      </saml:Attribute> 
      <saml:Attribute FriendlyName="uid" Name="uid"  
    NameFormat="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0: 
  attrname-format:basic"> 
        <saml:AttributeValue>the.user@mycompany.com 
        </saml:AttributeValue> 
      </saml:Attribute> 
    </saml:AttributeStatement> 
  </saml:Assertion> 
</samlp:Response> 
Figure 5:  Sample SAML Assertion 
For testing purposes with this sample assertion, the 
attributes toward the end of the XML should be verified.  
In this example, two attributes are being passed:  
clientID and uid.  The clientID is a unique value that has 
been assigned by the service provider indicating which 
company is sending the assertion.  The uid in this case is 
the email address of the user requesting the web 
resource.  After receiving and validating these values, the 
service provider application performs SSO for the user.  
Once these values have been tested and accepted as 
accurate, the SAML assertion can be encrypted if 
required, and the service provider application can be 
fully tested. 
There are important security aspects to be considered, 
given that the relying party fully trusts the data in the 
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SAML assertion.  The integrity of the message must be 
preserved from man-in-the-middle attacks and other 
spoofs.  In dealing with this scenario, A SAML assertion 
can be unsigned, signed, or signed and encrypted 
depending on the type of data and the sensitivity required 
per application.  The SAML standard allows for message 
integrity by supporting X509 digital signatures in the 
request/response transmissions.  SAML also supports 
and recommends HTTP over SSL 3.0 and TLS 1.0 for 
situations where data confidentiality is required [8]. 
As analyzed by Hansen, Skriver, and Nielson there are 
some major issues in the SAML 1.1 browser/artifact 
profile using TLS security [9].  In SAML 2.0, this profile 
was improved to repair a majority of these security 
issues; however there is one existing problem in the 
specification examined by Groß and Pfitzmann [10].  
Groß and Pfitzmann devised a solution to this exploit by 
creating a new profile that produces two artifacts, with 
the token being valid only when it consists of both 
values, thus eliminating successful replay of a single 
token.  Additional work has also been performed on 
recently proposed attack scenarios.  Gajek, Liao, and 
Schwenk recommend two new stronger bindings for 
SAML artifacts to the TLS security layer [11]. 
An additional scenario that could compromise data 
integrity is a replay attack that intercepts the valid 
assertion and saves the data for impersonation at a later 
time.  Both the identity provider and the service provider 
should utilize the SAML attributes NotBefore and 
NotOnOrAfter shown in Figure 5.  These values should 
contain a time frame that is as short as possible, usually 
around 5 minutes.  In addition, the identity provider can 
insert locality information into the assertion, which the 
service provider can verify is valid against the IP address 
of the requesting user.  For additional security 
considerations, see the OASIS security and privacy 
considerations standard [8]. 
4. Conclusions/Best Practices 
In conclusion, the benefits of SAML are abundant.  
Organizations can easily, yet securely share identity 
information and security is improved by eliminating the 
possibility of shared accounts.  User experience is 
enhanced by eliminating additional usernames and 
passwords, which also allows for fewer helpdesk calls 
and administrative costs. 
Companies should have documentation available to 
exchange when setting up SAML associations, since 
each SAML use case can be customized per individual 
business need.  Service providers can use different 
security protocols, such as signed only, versus signed 
and encrypted.  In addition, some service providers may 
only use the nameID section of the assertion, while 
others might use custom attributes only.  This upfront 
documentation can save troubleshooting time during the 
implementation and testing phases of the project. 
Furthermore, during testing phases it is helpful to use a 
sample test site for the service provider and also to test 
with SAML assertions signed only.  The sample test site 
allows for the ability to isolate a test of only the SAML 
connection between the two partners, before testing of 
the application occurs.  Testing with signed only 
assertions allows for the ability to URL decode the 
HTML hidden input field, and validate the data being 
passed to the service provider.  This ensures the correct 
data in the assertion is sent and can be tested prior to the 
service provider site being fully prepared for testing. 
Additionally, using SAML metadata is very helpful since 
it eliminates typos and errors when setting up the partner 
entity.  These metadata files can help the identity 
provider understand exactly what the service provider 
needs in the SAML assertion.  Both the identity provider 
and service provider should utilize metadata files, not 
only to speed up manual work when entering data into 
the federation software, but to also reduce human error. 
The OASIS Security Services Technical Committee 
continues to improve upon the current SAML 2.0 
standard by developing new profiles to possibly be used 
in later releases.  For example, one area OASIS has 
already improved upon was a supplement to the metadata 
specifications that added new elements and descriptor 
types.  Both identity providers and service providers 
should be aware of any changes to SAML standards that 
are ratified by OASIS.  Staying current and not deviating 
from the standards helps to ensure compatibility, 
resulting in less customized configurations between 
organizations. 
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